Age Rating Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Implications for Coverage, Costs and Household Financial Burdens by Bowen Garrett et al.
Age Rating Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform:
Implications for Coverage, Costs,  
and Household Financial Burdens
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues
October 2009
Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens and Bowen Garrett
Introduction 
One of the central goals of 
comprehensive health care reform is 
to eliminate discrimination by health 
status in the sales and pricing of health 
insurance and reduce the financial 
burdens associated with poor health. 
Consequently, current proposals 
being considered by Congress would 
prohibit health insurers from setting 
premiums based explicitly on the health 
experience of enrollees. These proposals 
would promote sharing of health care 
risk by limiting, but not eliminating, 
the differences in premiums charged 
to individuals of different ages. The age 
rating limits are quite different across 
the proposals under consideration. The 
Baucus proposal (as of September 16, 
2009),1 for example, would allow age 
rating bands of 5:1 (i.e., the premiums 
charged the oldest adults could be 
no more than 5 times those charged 
younger adults), while the House Tri-
Committee proposal and the Senate 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pension 
(HELP) Committee proposal would 
limit age rating bands to 2:1. The larger 
the variation permitted in premiums 
based upon age, the less broadly risk 
is shared, as health care expenditures 
tend to increase with age.2 The smaller 
the variation permitted, the greater is 
the extent to which younger individuals 
who purchase coverage will tend to 
cross-subsidize the health care expenses 
of older individuals. 
Such differences in age rating bands 
will lead to significant differences 
in the distribution of health care 
burdens across individuals and families 
of different ages, particularly those 
enrolling in coverage independently 
through the proposed National Health 
Insurance Exchange (referred to here as 
“the exchange”). This analysis highlights 
these differences, providing insight into 
the trade-offs inherent in this policy 
choice. We compare the distributional 
consequences across individuals and 
families under a health care reform 
approach similar to that delineated in 
Summary 
Recent proposals for comprehensive health care reform 
that have emerged from the US House of Representatives 
and Senate have differed in the premium rating rules that 
would be applied to non-elderly adults (those below age 
65). Current proposals range from allowing insurers to set 
premiums for older adults as much as 5 times as high as 
those for younger adults for identical coverage to limiting 
the highest premiums to twice that of the lowest.
While allowing considerable variation in premiums by age 
reduces premiums for younger adults, it increases them 
for older adults. Thus, the choice of premium rating rules 
can have significant implications for the financial burdens 
placed upon individuals and families under reform.
In this paper, researchers from the Urban Institute use 
their Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) to 
quantify the financial implications of the premium rating 
policy choice for households of different ages, incomes, 
and sizes. They compare 5:1 and 2:1 age rating rating to 
pure community rating and base their simulations on the 
structure of subsidies and insurance reforms outlined in 
the House Tri-Committee health care reform bill (H.R. 
3200). The analysis focuses largely on those with incomes 
above 133 percent of the federal poverty level who would 
purchase health insurance coverage directly through the 
new National Health Insurance Exchange. 
The authors find that there is little difference in overall 
health insurance coverage or aggregate spending under 
reform, regardless of the premium rating option chosen. 
However, practical affordability of total health care costs 
(premiums and out-of-pocket expenses) will be strongly 
related to premium rating rules for those individuals 
and families with incomes too high to qualify for federal 
subsidies, particularly those with incomes between 400 and 
500 percent of the federal poverty level. For many older 
adults and older families, the higher out-of-pocket costs that 
come with greater medical use in older age, combined with 
high premiums due to steep age rating (such as 5:1 bands), 
would lead to a high burden of total health care costs 
relative to income.
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the House Tri-Committee proposal (H.R. 
3200) using age rating of 5:1, 2:1, and 
1:1 (i.e., pure community rating where 
all ages are charged the same premium). 
This analysis takes into account the 
financial protections that would be 
provided through premium and out-of-
pocket subsidies in the exchange for  
the modest income population under 
the House Tri-Committee bill. While  
our primary focus is on household 
financial burdens for different age 
and income groups under health 
care reform, we also summarize the 
implications of the different rating rules 
for health insurance coverage and the 
costs associated with health care reform. 
The analysis concentrates largely on 
the population enrolling in non-group 
health insurance coverage through  
the exchange. 
Methods
This paper uses the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM). HIPSM models the 
decisions of businesses and individuals 
in response to policy changes, such 
as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for the 
purchase of health insurance, and 
insurance market reforms. The model 
simulates changes in government and 
private costs, rates of employer offers  
of coverage, and enrollment decisions  
of individuals/families in public, 
employer-based, and non-group health 
insurance coverage under a wide variety 
of reforms.
The model uses data from several 
national data sets: the March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement, the February 
CPS Contingent Work and Alternative 
Employment Supplement, the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the 
Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use  
Tax File, and the Statistics of US 
Business. A description of the 
construction of the model can be found 
in Garrett el. (2009).3
Age rating is simulated in the model 
using 5 adult age categories: 18-24, 25-
34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64.4 Premium 
rates under reform for each of the 5 
adult age groups are determined as 
follows. For each age group, the average 
insured cost is computed over those 
covered by an exchange plan. We 
then scale these averages in a way that 
reduces the ratio between the lowest 
and highest groups to the specified 
level and, at the same time, preserves 
the overall average insured cost. The 
adjustment used has the important 
property that it preserves the ratios 
of average costs between the various 
groups. Premium administrative loads 
are then added to these adjusted 
averages. Non-group premiums are 
constructed by summing the appropriate 
premium costs for each member of the 
health insurance unit, consistent with 
private non-group insurance practices.5 
As a result, premiums will vary not only 
with the age, but also by the number of 
individuals in the family.6
This analysis uses the core of the 
House Tri-Committee health reform 
proposal as a basis of comparison of 
the distributional effects of the three 
rating approaches (5:1, 2:1, 1:1). In 
order to facilitate exposition, a few 
simplifications to that proposal have 
been made, however. While the 
proposal would provide enrollees in 
the health insurance exchange a choice 
among private plans and a public plan 
with three different levels of actuarial 
value, we simulate only one level of 
actuarial value (70 percent) for this 
analysis and do not model the presence 
of the public plan. Appropriate out-
of-pocket subsidies consistent with 
the proposal are modeled, however, 
which effectively increases the actuarial 
value of the plans provided to the low 
income population. We make these 
simplifications in order to avoid having 
to present premiums for multiple 
different insurance options and to 
eliminate the analytic complexity 
associated with the fact that variations 
in age rating will prompt individuals 
of different ages to choose higher or 
lower actuarial value plans in response 
to facing higher or lower prices for 
their age group. These simplifications 
do not substantively impact the results 
as presented. Tables averaging over 
multiple plan options are available upon 
request from the authors. 
The reforms are modeled as if they were 
fully implemented in the year 2009, 
with all behavior by employers and 
households having reached equilibrium.7 
The data on premiums, out-of-pocket 
health care costs, and the distribution 
of health care financing burdens 
relative to income are provided for 
those individuals and families enrolling 
in coverage independently through 
the exchange. This group constitutes 
roughly 9-10 percent of the non-elderly 
population and reflects a population 
that would be significantly affected by 
reform—those without current offers 
of health insurance through their 
employers who would not be eligible for 
free coverage through Medicaid. 
Private coverage includes those 
enrolling in employer sponsored 
insurance coverage (either inside—
employers with up to 50 workers—
or outside of the health insurance 
exchange) and those enrolling in non-
group coverage through the exchange.8 
Public coverage includes Medicaid, 
Medicare, and military coverage. All 
results that follow include those below 
age 65 only.
Results
Health insurance coverage. Table 
1 shows the distribution of health 
insurance coverage for adults (by age 
group) and children under each of the 
three premium rating options. Overall, 
there is almost no difference across the 
premium rating options in the share of 
the total population that would be left 
uninsured. In each case, just under 6 
percent of the population would remain 
uninsured, including undocumented 
residents and those opting to pay a 
penalty rather than enroll in qualifying 
health insurance coverage. There are 
small differences, however, in coverage 
among the youngest and oldest age 
groups, depending upon the rating rules 
chosen. The near elderly (age 55 to 64) 
would be more likely to be uninsured 
under 5:1 (7.3% uninsured) or 2:1 (5.8% 
uninsured) rating than under pure 
community rating (4.8% uninsured) 
while younger adults (age 18 to 24) are 
more likely to be uninsured under pure 
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community rating (8.6% uninsured 
versus 7.2% under 5:1 age rating).
Aggregate government, employer, 
and household spending. Table 2 
shows the costs associated with health 
care reform under the current system 
and under each of the reform premium 
rating options. There is little difference 
in costs across the 3 rating options. The 
5:1 age rating option would increase 
government costs ($349 billion) relative 
to pure community rating or 2:1 age 
rating ($345 billion under either). The 
main reason for the higher costs under 
5:1 age rating is that the average subsidy 
provided to the older individuals goes 
up more than the average subsidy for 
the younger age groups falls relative 
to the pure community rating case. 
Since the maximum premium to be 
paid by a subsidy-eligible unit is a fixed 
percentage of income, the number 
of those receiving subsidies in each 
age group does not change much 
with variation in age-rating. Thus, the 
difference in average subsidies means 
higher overall subsidy costs. 
In addition, employer spending under 
5:1 or 2:1 rating is somewhat higher 
than under pure community rating 
because more individuals remain in 
employer-based insurance due to the 
exchange-based options being less 
attractive to older workers with pre-
reform employer coverage. Household 
spending does not change significantly 
across the rating options. System-wide 
spending on health care is therefore 
approximately 1.4 percent higher 
under 5:1 age rating than under pure 
community rating (1:1).
Average premiums. Table 3 shows 
the full unsubsidized average non- 
group premiums in the health insurance 
exchange for each adult age group 
Table 1.  Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform By Premium  
Age Rating Option and Age of Covered Individuals, 2009
Age Group Age Rating Restriction Private Health Insurance Public Coverage Uninsured Total
Children, <18
1:1 57.0% 38.0% 5.0% 100.0%
2:1 57.2% 38.2% 4.6% 100.0%
5:1 57.2% 38.6% 4.2% 100.0%
18-24
1:1 48.2% 43.2% 8.6% 100.0%
2:1 50.0% 41.9% 8.1% 100.0%
5:1 52.7% 40.1% 7.2% 100.0%
25-34
1:1 72.2% 22.0% 5.8% 100.0%
2:1 72.4% 22.0% 5.6% 100.0%
5:1 72.9% 22.0% 5.0% 100.0%
35-44
1:1 77.9% 17.4% 4.7% 100.0%
2:1 77.9% 17.4% 4.7% 100.0%
5:1 78.1% 17.4% 4.5% 100.0%
45-54
1:1 79.1% 16.1% 4.8% 100.0%
2:1 78.8% 16.2% 5.0% 100.0%
5:1 78.5% 16.2% 5.4% 100.0%
55-64
1:1 71.2% 23.9% 4.8% 100.0%
2:1 70.0% 24.2% 5.8% 100.0%
5:1 68.3% 24.5% 7.3% 100.0%
All Non-Elderly
1:1 72.2% 22.4% 5.4% 100.0%
2:1 72.2% 22.2% 5.6% 100.0%
5:1 72.3% 22.0% 5.7% 100.0%
Source: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 2009. 
Note: Analysis based on the subsidy and health insurance exchange structure in the House Tri-Committee proposal, H.R. 3200.
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under each premium rating option. 
Premiums do not vary by age under pure 
community (1:1) rating as the  
costs for all age groups are pooled 
together. Average family premiums  
will vary modestly with age as the 
average number of family members 
varies somewhat across age groups. 
Under this approach, the premium 
for a single policy would be $3,744. 
Average family policies would range 
from $7,478 to $7,856, with families 
with no members age 45 to 64 tending 
to be a little larger and hence facing a 
somewhat higher average premium than 
families with at least one member in that 
older age group.
Under 2:1 age rating, the premiums 
increase from youngest to oldest, 
with the youngest adult (18-24) single 
premiums just under $3,000 and the 
oldest adult (55-64) premiums averaging 
just under $6,000. The largest relative 
increase between age groups comes 
between the 45 to 54 year olds and the 
55 to 64 year olds, with the latter group’s 
premium 31 percent higher than that 
of the former. There is only a 9 percent 
difference between the youngest two 
age groups. Among families, average 
premiums range from $6,949 for a  
family with no members in the 45 to  
64 age group to $9,662 for a family  
with two members in the 45 to 64 age 
group, a premium difference of almost 
40 percent.
In the case of 5:1 age rating, premiums 
for the youngest single adults are $1,884, 
lower than the 2:1 age rated premiums 
for this group by $1,081. The oldest 
age group premium under 5:1 would 
be $9,420, or almost $3,500 higher 
than the premiums that they would 
face under 2:1 age rating. Again, the 
largest relative difference between age 
categories occurs between the oldest 
two groups, where the premiums 
charged for a 55-64 year old would be 
69 percent higher than that for a 45 to 
54 year old. Differences by age can also 
be seen in the family premiums. The 
average premium for a family with two 
members age 45 to 64 would be $12,590, 
compared to $5,861 for a family with no 
member in that age group. The average 
premium decrease for the youngest 
family type of moving from 2:1 to 5:1 
rating would be almost $1,100 whereas 
the average premium increase from the 
same move for the oldest family type 
would be about $3,000.
Premium and out-of-pocket costs, 
taking subsidies into account. Table 
4 shows average household spending  
of those enrolled in the exchange by 
those of different ages and incomes 
under the three premium rating 
options. These averages by categories 
of individual insurance purchasers and 
family purchasers reflect premiums plus 
out-of-pocket health care spending less 
any subsidies for which the purchasers 
are eligible. 
The variation in out-of-pocket spending 
across premium rating options within 




Medicaid/CHIP and Household Subsidies 253 349 349 352
Employer Subsidies 0 8 8 9
Less Assessments and Penalties 0 12 12 12
Net Government Spending 253 345 345 349
Uncompensated Care 62 23 24 24
Employer Spending, incl. assessments 415 420 428 432
Household Spending, incl. penalties 324 343 344 342
Total Public and Private Spending 1,054 1,131 1,141 1,147
Source: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 2009. 
Notes:  Analysis based on the subsidy and health insurance exchange structure in the House Tri-Committee proposal, H.R. 3200.
Household spending includes health insurance premium payments by workers and others as well as direct out-of-pocket 
spending on medical care and penalties for non-compliance with the individual mandate.
Table 2.  Aggregate Government, Employer, and Household Costs Under 
Comprehensive Health Care Reform by Premium Age Rating  
Option, 2009 (in billions)
Age Group Premium Rating Option
1:1 2:1 5:1
Single Adults
18-24 3,744 2,965 1,884
25-34 3,744 3,237 2,648
35-44 3,744 3,575 3,482
45-54 3,744 4,516 5,564
55-64 3,744 5,930 9,420
Family Units
No family member age 45 to 64 7,856 6,949 5,861
One family member age 45 to 64 7,537 8,146 8,720
Two family members age 45 to 64 7,478 9,662 12,590
Source: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 2009. 
Notes:   Analysis based on the subsidy and health insurance exchange structure in the House Tri-Committee proposal, H.R. 3200. 
Premiums are based upon a 70% actuarial value plan.
Table 3.  Average Premium for Exchange Based Non-Group Health  
Insurance Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform By Premium 
Age Rating Option and Age of Covered Individuals, 2009
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those in the most highly subsidized 
income group, 133-300 percent of 
the federal poverty level (FPL). The 
combination of the premium subsidies 
which limit the share of income that 
must be spent to obtain coverage and 
the lower cost-sharing requirements for 
this income group provide considerable 
spending protection for the older age 
individuals, even under 5:1 age rating. 
Even among this lowest income group, 
there do remain some differences in 
average spending across the rating 
options since individuals of different 
ages will be more or less likely to enroll 
in non-group coverage through the 
exchange depending upon the rating 
rules in place. 
For the 300-400 percent of the FPL 
group, the subsidies provided for 
exchange coverage do not dominate the 
premium rating rules to the same extent 
as they do for the lower income group. 
Table 4.  Net Cost to Families (Premiums plus Out-of-Pocket Costs Less Subsidies) for Exchange-Based  
Non-Group Policyholders Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform By Premium Age Rating Option, 
Age of Covered Individuals, and Income Relative to Poverty, 2009
Age Group of Single Units Age Rating Restriction Income Relative to Poverty
133-300% 300-400% 400%+
18-24
1:1 1,622 4,580 4,415
2:1 1,579 3,787 3,767
5:1 1,422 2,715 2,689
25-34
1:1 1,826 4,328 4,426
2:1 1,806 3,881 3,917
5:1 1,762 3,300 3,322
35-44
1:1 1,861 4,568 4,726
2:1 1,870 4,392 4,559
5:1 1,869 4,299 4,464
45-54
1:1 1,874 4,825 5,016
2:1 1,879 5,431 5,708
5:1 1,882 5,702 6,682
55-64
1:1 2,103 5,089 5,458
2:1 2,004 5,975 7,378
5:1 1,923 5,986 10,617
Age Group of Family Units Age Rating Restriction Income Relative to Poverty
133-300% 300-400% 400%+
No family member age 45 to 64
1:1 3,095 8,188 10,346
2:1 2,999 7,901 9,679
5:1 2,947 7,515 8,753
One family member age 45 to 64
1:1 3,435 7,484 9,837
2:1 3,449 8,113 10,435
5:1 3,475 8,655 11,027
Two family members age 45 to 64
1:1 4,109 8,600 10,227
2:1 4,114 8,997 12,166
5:1 4,177 9,423 14,793
Source: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 2009. 
Notes: Analysis based on the subsidy and health insurance exchange structure in the House Tri-Committee proposal, H.R. 3200. Premiums are based upon a 70% actuarial value plan.
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Direct spending patterns related to 
age become evident. Average spending 
for premiums and out-of-pocket costs 
average $4,580 for 18-24 year old single 
policyholders under pure community 
rating, but only $2,715 under 5:1 
rating. For these young adults, the 
premium subsidies are not significant 
(as evidenced by the similarity in 
their spending to their higher income 
unsubsidized counterparts) and their 
use of health care services is low.  
Conversely, for the older adults in this 
income range, even the more limited 
subsidies available to them limit 
their direct spending on health care, 
compressing the differences across 
the age rating options. In this income 
group, average spending for single 
policyholders age 55 to 64 are $5,089 
under 1:1 rating and are $5,986 under 
5:1 rating. The subsidies to families in 
this income group continue to limit 
average spending as well as blunt the 
differences across rating options.
The 400 percent of FPL and higher 
income group shows the implications  
of the three rating options for individual 
and family policyholders who are 
not eligible for any federal financial 
assistance with premiums or out-
of-pocket costs. While there is little 
difference across the rating options 
for the 35-44 single policy holders, 
the differences for younger and 
older individuals and family units are 
substantial. A single policy holder  
aged 55 to 64 would face average 
spending of $10,617 under 5:1 rating, 
about $5,100 more than their $5,458 
average spending under 1:1 rating. In 
contrast, the average savings resulting 
from moving from 1:1 to 5:1 rating for 
the youngest adults in this income group 
is about $1700. Similar patterns are 
observed for family units.
Financial Burdens: Direct 
Household Health Spending Relative 
to Income. Table 5 provides information 
on the distribution of household 
health care financing burdens by age 
and income under the three rating 
options. We show the median and 90th 
percentile share of income devoted 
to health care within each age and 
income category. We provide results by 
narrower income groups than in the 
prior table in order to more clearly show 
the financial burden differences across 
premium rating options as subsidies 
phase down with income and for those 
just over the subsidy eligibility level.
Because of the significant premium 
and out-of-pocket subsidies provided 
through the reform proposal for the 
lowest income populations, the choice 
of rating option has almost no impact  
on the health care financing burdens  
of those below 300 percent of the  
FPL purchasing non-group coverage 
in the exchange. For example, for the 
median young adult age 18-24 with 
income between 133 and 200 percent  
of the FPL, health care spending  
would account for about 5 percent of 
income under this reform, regardless  
of the rating option used. Ten percent  
of this group of young adults would 
spend 7 percent of their incomes or 
more on health.9
However, as income increases and the 
subsidies decrease and are phased-out, 
very significant differences in burden 
across rating options emerge. The 
differences are particularly evident 
for the income group just beyond the 
subsidy eligibility range, those between 
400 and 500 percent of the FPL. For 
single policyholder adults age 55-64 in 
this income range, the median health 
care financing burden is 9.8 percent of 
income under 1:1 rating, 14.4 percent 
under 2:1 rating, and a startling 21.6 
percent of income under 5:1 rating. At 
the 90th percentile the financing burden 
for this group is 19.1 percent under 
1:1 rating, rising to 18.9 percent under 
2:1 and 26.5 percent under 5:1. For the 
youngest adults in this income group, 
the differences in health care financing 
burdens are not quite as dramatic across 
the rating options. Median spending for 
18-24 year olds would be 8.5 percent at 
the median under 1:1 rating, falling to 
6.9 percent under 2:1, and 4.7 percent 
under 5:1. At the 90th percentile, their 
financing burden would be 10.4 percent 
under 1:1, 8.8 percent under 2:1, and 
6.4 percent under 5:1. Similar patterns 
emerge among those with incomes 
above 500 percent of the FPL, although 
the relative financial burdens are 
somewhat lower across the board due 
to the group’s higher incomes. Averaged 
over all enrollees in the unsubsidized 
income groups, age rating increases 
financial burdens at the 90th percentiles 
compared to 1:1 rating. 
For families ineligible for subsidies 
(incomes over 400 percent of the FPL), 
the premium rating choice can have 
significant implications for financial 
burden, particularly in the case of 
families with two members age 45 to 
64. For these older families in the 400 
to 500 percent of the FPL income group, 
median health spending would be 14.0 
percent of income under 1:1 rating, 
16.0 percent of income with 2:1 rating, 
and 16.6 percent of income with 5:1 
rating. At the 90th percentile, financing 
burdens for this group would amount to 
21.4 percent of income under 1:1 rating, 
about 22.9 percent of income under 2:1, 
and 27.7 percent of income under 5:1.
Discussion
This analysis finds that choice of 
premium rating (pure community 
rating/1:1 rating, 2:1 age rating, or  
5:1 age rating) would have very 
little effect on overall rates of health 
insurance coverage or on aggregate 
health spending of government, 
employers, and households under 
comprehensive reform similar to 
the House Tri-Committee proposal. 
However, we do find that different 
premium rating options would have 
very significant implications for the 
distribution of health care financing 
burdens on individuals enrolling in 
health insurance coverage directly 
through the new exchange. While 
subsidies provided by the federal 
government to those with incomes 
below 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level ameliorate the lion’s share 
of premium differences due to the 
choice of rating, rating differences will 
significantly alter health care financing 
burdens for the youngest and oldest 
adults and families with higher incomes.
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 7
Table 5.  Distribution of Health Care Spending Relative to Income [(Premiums + Out-of-Pocket Costs – Subsidies)/
Income] for Non-Group Insurance Purchasers in the Exchange By Premium Age Rating Option, Age of 
Covered Individuals, and Income Relative to Poverty




Financial Burden (Median and 90th Percentile) by Income Relative to Poverty
133-200% FPL 200-300% FPL 300-400% FPL 400-500% FPL 500%+ FPL
50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th
18-24
1:1 5.0% 6.9% 9.6% 13.5% 11.2% 16.4% 8.5% 10.4% 6.1% 8.3%
2:1 5.1% 7.0% 9.5% 12.8% 9.0% 13.5% 6.9% 8.8% 4.9% 7.2%
5:1 5.1% 7.0% 7.9% 10.5% 6.0% 10.7% 4.7% 6.4% 3.1% 5.7%
25-34
1:1 5.4% 6.9% 9.8% 12.3% 11.4% 14.6% 8.8% 11.9% 5.5% 8.1%
2:1 5.4% 7.0% 9.7% 12.2% 9.9% 13.9% 7.7% 10.2% 4.8% 7.4%
5:1 5.4% 7.0% 9.2% 11.6% 8.2% 12.3% 6.5% 8.9% 4.0% 6.5%
35-44
1:1 5.1% 7.5% 10.1% 13.1% 11.6% 17.0% 8.6% 13.8% 5.8% 8.0%
2:1 5.1% 7.5% 10.1% 13.0% 10.9% 16.5% 8.3% 13.4% 5.6% 7.7%
5:1 5.1% 7.5% 10.1% 13.0% 10.7% 15.9% 8.1% 13.2% 5.5% 7.5%
45-54
1:1 5.2% 8.0% 10.2% 14.7% 12.3% 17.9% 9.6% 15.6% 6.2% 9.1%
2:1 5.2% 8.0% 10.2% 14.5% 13.6% 19.7% 11.1% 16.7% 7.2% 10.3%
5:1 5.2% 8.2% 10.2% 14.7% 14.5% 20.1% 13.2% 18.6% 8.5% 11.9%
55-64
1:1 5.7% 8.3% 11.2% 19.0% 12.7% 19.1% 9.8% 19.1% 5.9% 12.0%
2:1 5.7% 8.3% 11.0% 17.2% 15.1% 20.5% 14.4% 18.9% 8.4% 14.1%
5:1 5.7% 8.3% 10.7% 16.1% 15.0% 20.7% 21.6% 26.5% 10.4% 16.9%
All, 18-64
1:1 5.2% 7.4% 10.1% 14.2% 11.7% 17.1% 9.1% 14.9% 5.9% 9.8%
2:1 5.3% 7.4% 9.9% 13.6% 11.3% 17.8% 9.1% 15.5% 6.3% 10.7%
5:1 5.3% 7.4% 9.2% 13.2% 9.8% 17.1% 7.9% 17.7% 6.2% 11.6%




Financial Burden (Median and 90th Percentile) by Income Relative to Poverty
133-200% FPL 200-300% FPL 300-400% FPL 400-500% FPL 500%+ FPL
50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th 50th 90th
No family member age 45 to 64
1:1 5.4% 9.7% 9.9% 15.6% 12.5% 19.2% 12.6% 19.0% 7.7% 13.0%
2:1 5.3% 9.1% 9.5% 14.8% 12.4% 18.3% 11.9% 16.9% 7.4% 11.9%
5:1 5.3% 8.7% 9.3% 14.7% 11.9% 17.3% 10.5% 14.6% 6.7% 10.8%
One family member age 45 to 64
1:1 5.3% 10.4% 10.8% 16.4% 12.4% 19.8% 12.5% 15.9% 7.5% 12.9%
2:1 5.3% 10.1% 10.9% 16.5% 13.0% 20.0% 13.6% 17.2% 7.7% 12.9%
5:1 5.3% 10.6% 10.9% 16.5% 13.9% 20.2% 13.7% 18.1% 8.5% 14.0%
Two family members age 45 to 64
1:1 6.7% 13.6% 11.5% 18.2% 15.0% 23.0% 14.0% 21.4% 7.9% 13.1%
2:1 6.3% 13.7% 11.6% 19.0% 15.5% 26.3% 16.0% 22.9% 9.3% 15.1%
5:1 6.8% 13.7% 11.8% 19.6% 15.9% 25.0% 16.6% 27.7% 10.5% 18.0%
All families
1:1 5.6% 10.2% 10.5% 17.1% 13.4% 21.4% 13.5% 19.5% 7.8% 13.1%
2:1 5.5% 9.9% 10.4% 17.0% 13.3% 20.8% 13.4% 20.7% 8.3% 14.0%
5:1 5.4% 9.7% 10.2% 16.9% 13.1% 21.1% 12.6% 19.7% 8.4% 16.0%
Source: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 2009. 
Notes: Analysis based on the subsidy and health insurance exchange structure in the House Tri-Committee proposal, H.R. 3200. Premiums are based upon a 70% actuarial value plan.
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For example, under 5:1 age rating, half 
of single adults in the 55 to 64 age group 
with incomes between 400 and 500 
percent of the FPL would face health 
care financing burdens of 21.6 percent 
or more of their incomes, whereas the 
median financing burden for this group 
would be 14.4 percent under 2:1 rating 
and 9.8 percent under pure community 
rating. While 5:1 rating would lower the 
financial burdens for 18 to 24 year olds 
in this income group (median spending 
4.7 percent of income as compared to 
6.9 percent under 2:1 and 8.5 percent 
under 1:1) the affordability concerns are 
substantially more pronounced for the 
older age group. While 5:1 rating would 
lower financial burdens for the 25 to 34 
age group and increase them for the 45 
to 54 age group compared to 2:1 or 1:1 
rating, the difference that rating makes 
for these age groups are smaller than for 
their younger and older counterparts. 
In addition, regardless of which rating 
option is chosen, over 90 percent of 
young adults age 18-24 enrolling in 
coverage through the exchange would 
be eligible for income-related subsidies 
(data not shown), thereby protecting 
them from the full effects of broader 
based sharing of health care costs with 
their older counterparts. The same is 
true for over 80 percent of adults age 
25-34 enrolling in non-group coverage 
through the exchange. 
Premium and out-of-pocket subsidies 
provided by the federal government 
under H.R. 3200 would go a significant 
distance in making access to medical 
care affordable for those individuals 
and families in the subsidized income 
range of 133 to 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level. However, practical 
affordability of total health care costs 
(premiums and out-of-pocket expenses) 
will be strongly related to premium 
rating rules for those individuals and 
families with incomes just outside of the 
subsidy eligibility range. For many older 
adults and older families, the higher out-
of-pocket costs that come with greater 
medical use in older age, combined 
with high premiums due to steep age 
rating (such as 5:1 bands), would lead 
to a high burden of total health care 
costs relative to income. The majority 
of adults age 55 to 64 purchasing non-
group coverage through the exchange 
would face a burden of more than 20 
percent of income for a single policy. 
In order to make combined premium 
and out-of-pocket health care burdens 
affordable by conventional standards for 
this older middle income population, 
premium subsidies could be extended to 
higher incomes than are currently being 
considered or the variance in age-rating 
bands could be limited to a maximum of 
2:1, perhaps with a plan to phase down 
further over time.
Notes
1 More recent amendments to the Baucus proposal 
have reduced age rating to 4:1. We have simulated 
this as well, and the results are close to those for 
5:1. In the interest of a timely release of this paper 
4:1 results are not reproduced here, but are avail-
able upon request.
2 For example, the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey Household Component (MEPS-HC) shows 
that in 2006, the most recent data available, adults 
age 18-44 are both less likely to have any medi-
cal expense than their counterparts age 45-64 
or 65 and over (76.9 percent, 89.3 percent, and 
96.7 percent, respectively) and have lower aver-
age medical expenses given that they have any 
expenses ($2703, $5455, and $9080, respectively). 
Data tables can be access at:  http://www.meps.
ahrq.gov.
3  Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, Irene Headen, and 
Aaron Lucas. “The Coverage and Cost Impacts of 
Expanding Medicaid.” Washington DC:  The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. May 
2009. Available at: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload7901.pdf.
4  Dependent children (under age 18) are rated to-
gether as a group and are not considered in devel-
oping the appropriate adult age rating boundaries. 
A small number of children are observed in the 
baseline data as being non-group insurance policy-
holders. These children are presumed to maintain 
their policyholder status post-reform, and their 
costs are included in establishing the premium 
rates for the youngest adult group (age 18-24). 
They are not, however, included in the presented 
tables with the young adults. The average cost  
per dependent child is added into family pre-
miums as appropriate. Premiums vary with the 
number of children as well as the number of 
adults in the family.
5  A health insurance unit consists of the group of 
family members that can typically enroll in private 
health insurance together.  This includes married 
adults, their dependent children up to age 18, and 
full-time students age less than 23.
6 For the remainder of this paper, “family” is used to 
refer to the health insurance unit. 
7 Baseline results for costs and coverage in 2009 
differ slightly from those we have reported else-
where because the model is continuously being 
updated. 
8 Only grandfathered non-group plans will persist 
outside of the exchange, and they are not taken 
into account in this simulation.
9 For single policyholders age 55 to 64 in the 200 to 
300 percent of the FPL group, health care spend-
ing relative to income at the 90th percentile is  
higher (19 percent) under 1:1 rating than under 
5:1 rating (16 percent). This seeming anomaly is 
the consequence of a small additional number of 
high cost individuals enrolling in the exchange 
when the rating rules are more favorable for this 
age group.
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